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THE CHANGING STANDARDS
FOR OBSCENITY
In 1957 the Supreme Court decided that obscene matter, be-
cause it lacked any social importance, was not protected by the
guaranties of the 1st and 14th Amendments of the United States
Constitution, and therefore, could be proscribed by federal or state
action.' As a standard for classifying matter as obscene or non-
obscene (constitutionally non-protected or constitutionally pro-
tected), the Court established the following test: ". . . Whether to
the average person, applying contemporary community standards,
the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to
prurient interests."2 A subsequent case added the requirement that
before material can be classed as obscene it must be so offensive on
its face as to affront current community standards.' "Obscenity .. .
thus requires proof of two distinct elements: (1) patent offensive-
ness; and (2) 'prurient interest' appeal. Both must conjoin before
challenged material can be found 'obscene' . . . , The Court's
opinion (joined in by only two of the Justices) in Jacobellis v. Ohio'
stated a third requirement for a determination of obscenity. That is,
the material, independent of the other two tests, must be utterly
without redeeming social value.' The other opinions did not consider
this aspect of the requirements for establishing material as obscene.
At this point three main problems remained in achieving an
understanding of the meaning of the Court's definition of obscenity.
These were: (1) what is the relevant community whose contempo-
1 "All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance-unorthodox
ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion-have
the full protection of the guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon the
limited area of more important interests. But implicit in the history of the First Amend-
ment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance."
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-485 (1957).
2 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
3 "For we find lacking in these magazines an element which, no less than 'prurient
interest,' is essential to a valid determination of obscenity ... , and to which neither
the Post Office Department nor the Court of Appeals addressed itself at all: These
magazines cannot be deemed so offensive to their face as to affront current community
standards of decency-a quality that we shall hereafter refer to as 'patent offensive-
ness' or 'indecency.' Lacking that quality, the magazines cannot be deemed legally
'obscene' .... ." Manual Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 482 (1962).
4 Manual Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 486 (1962) (opinion of Harlan, J.).
5 378 U.S. 184 (1964) (opinion of Brennan, J.).
6 "We would reiterate, however, our recognition in Roth that obscenity is excluded
from the constitutional protection only because it is 'utterly without social impor-
tance.' . . . Nor may the constitutional status of the material be made to turn on a
'weighing' of its social importance against its prurient appeal, for a work cannot be
proscribed unless it is 'utterly' without social importance." Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S.
184, 191 (1964) (opinion of Brennan, J.).
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rary standards are to be applied in judging "patent offensiveness"
and, whether the dominant theme of the material is an appeal to pru-
rient interests; (2) to whose prurient interest must the material
appeal-the average person in the community or the average person
in a subsection or subgroup of the community; (3) is ."without re-
deeming social value" a separate requirement for obscenity or is it
only a factor in, and a result of the fulfillment of the other two re-
quirements.
The first problem is still not conclusively resolved.7 In Manual
Enterprises v. Day two justices stated that the relevant community
is the nation, and that "patent offensiveness" and "prurient appeal"
are judged by national, not local standards of decency.8 Two more
justices agreed with this in Jacobellis v. Ohio.' However in this same
case, two other justices expressly stated that the community stan-
dard to be applied should be that of a community less than na-
tional."0 While there is no majority opinion on this point, if this
problem arose as a determinative factor in a case, the practical result
would probably be, that before the material could be ajudicated as
obscene, the national standard of decency would have to be applied
and affronted."
Problem number two is concerned with the question, what group
establishes the criterion for the "average" person to whose prurient
interest the material must appeal in order to satisfy the Roth test.
Is this "average" person the average person of the community or is
he the average person of a particular group less than the whole com-
munity? If the latter, what is that group and how is it defined? This
problem was first presented to the Court in Manual Enterprises v.
Day," but was not decided by the Court in that case.
Four years more passed before the above issue was directly
presented and decided by the Supreme Court. In the recent case
Mishkin v. New York," the appellant had been convicted of prepar-
7 This question did not arise in the three latest Supreme Court cases dealing with
obscenity. Ginzburg v. United States, 86 Sup. Ct. 942 (1966) ; Mishkin v. New York,
86 Sup. Ct. 958 (1966); A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of
Pleasure" v. Mass., 86 Sup. Ct. 974 (1966). See Ginzburg v. United States, supra at
952 (Black, J., dissenting).
8 370 U.S. at 488.
9 378 U.S. 184, 192-93.
10 Id. at 200 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
11 Because Justices Black and Douglas maintain the position that even obscenity
is protected by the 1st and 14th amendments, the requirements of the four justices ad-
vancing a national standard would have to be met on this issue before there would be
a majority of the Court in agreement as to the obscenity of a given item. See Ginzburg
v. United States, 86 Sup. Ct. 942, 968 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting) ; 86 Sup. Ct. 942,
969 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
12 370 U.S. 478, 482 (1962).
13 86 Sup. Ct. 958 (1966).
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ing, publishing and possessing with intent to sell, obscene books in
violation of New York Penal Law section 1141. The evidence fully
established that the books were concerned primarily with sadism
and masochism and that the books were primarily prepared for and
distributed to persons with sadistic or masochistic tendencies. 4 The
appellant pleaded that the Roth "prurient appeal" test for obscenity
had not been satisfied because the books "do not appeal to a prurient
interest of the 'average person' in sex, that 'instead of stimulating
the erotic, they disgust and sicken.' "'I If the "average" person in the
Roth test is derived from the whole community, then the appellant's
plea would probably have been sound and the books in question
would not have been obscene and thus would be constitutionally
protected.
The Court rejected the appellant's argument as being an incor-
rect interpretation of the Roth prurient-appeal requirement. The
Court went on to present what is the correct interpretation of this
requirement.
Where the material is designed for and primarily disseminated to
a clearly defined deviant sexual group, rather than the public at large,
the prurient-appeal requirement of the Roth test is satisfied if the dom-
inant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient
interest in sex of the members of that group. . . .We adjust the
prurient-appeal requirement to social realities by permitting the appeal
of this type of material to be assessed in terms of the sexual interests
of its intended and probable recipient group; and since our holding
requires that the recipient group be defined with more specificity than
in terms of sexually immature persons, it also avoids the inadequacy
of the most susceptible-person [test] .... 16
This would indicate that three requirements must be met before the
base for determining the average person can be shifted from the
community to a subgroup of such community. First there must be a
clearly defined deviant sexual group; second, the material in ques-
tion must be primarily designed for such group; and third, such
material must have as its intended and probable recipients that
defined group.
The reasoning behind this change in, or addition to the Roth
test is probably based on the realization that much of the material
to Which censors and society most object would not be legally obscene
if the prurient-appeal requirement depends for its satisfaction on an
appeal to the prurient interests of the community based average or
normal person. Sadistic or masochistic material as in the Mishkin
14 Id. at 964.
15 Mishkin v. New York, 86 Sup. Ct. 958, 963 (1966).
16 Id. at 963-964. (Emphasis added.)
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case or certain homosexual publications or other abnormal sexual
material might well not have as its dominant theme prurient interest
appeal to the sexually normal person. Thus, it would be constitu-
tionally protected and could not be proscribed. Yet, it is the acces-
sibility of just such material that arouses great indignation on the
part of parents and probably a large segment of society. The failure
of the Roth test as originally interpreted to logically include sexually
deviant material would seem to account for this reinterpretation of
the Roth requirement by the Supreme Court.
A question that immediately arises from the Mishkin case is,
are there groups or classes of persons other than sexually deviant
groups for which material might be designed and distributed which
would come within this new application of the Roth requirement for
prurient-appeal. To what extent is the base for the "average" person
to be changed from the community to various possible sub-classifica-
tions in the community? At the present time this question is un-
answerable. However, certain considerations exist which would
suggest that this variation of the class of the "average" person will be
restricted and will not become a means of censorship simply because
material appeals to the prurient interest of a group into whose pos-
session the material may fall." The two requirements for design and
distribution to a defined group plus the other general requirements
for establishing obscenity (patent offensiveness and probably, utter
lack of social value) will restrict the effect of this new interpretation
of the Roth test. But a more important factor in limiting the Court
in the expansion of the possible applicable groups is that here the
Court is dealing with total, rather than partial or temporary pro-
scription of material. In Roth the Court expressly rejected the
Regina v. Hicklin5 test which made the possibility of censorship
turn on the material's impact on the most susceptible group.1 9 How-
ever it is possible that the Mishkin concept of variable "average"
persons could be applied to more diverse groupings and still not in-
fringe on the rights of the remainder of society. This expansion may
be possible through a careful and restricted interpretation and appli-
cation of the designed for and distributed to requirements. 20
The third problem as to the status of the social value criterion
was presented and considered in A Book Named "John Cleland's
17 See Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957), which eliminated children as a
measure for defining obscenity.
18 [1868] L.R. 3 Q.B. 360.
19 The Court expressly reiterates this position. 86 Sup. Ct. at 964.
20 For a discussion of a similar concept, but one which would extend the possible
variations of the meaning of obscenity, see Lockhardt & McClure, Censorship of
Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 MiNN. L. REV. 5 (1960).
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Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Mass.2 (Hereafter referred
to as A Book Etc. v. Mass.) The Massachusetts Supreme Court had
held that this book was obscene because its dominant theme was an
appeal to prurient interest, it was patently offensive, and any mini-
mal literary value the book possessed was insufficient in social im-
portance to overcome the other two factors.22 This raised the issue
of whether "utter lack of social value" of material is a separate and
additional requirement which must be met before declaring a work
obscene or is the question of a work's social value only a factor in
determining its dominant appeal and patent offensiveness and only a
factor to be weighed against the other two requirements in deciding
the question of obscenity. The only prior discussion of this issue was
in Jacobellis v. Ohio,2" which represented, on this issue, the opinion
of only two justices.
In the Court's opinion-which only three justices joined-in
A Book Etc. v. Mass.,24 Justice Brennan said:
The Supreme Judicial Court of Mass. erred in holding that a book
need not be "unqualifiedly worthless before it can be deemed obscene".
A book can not be proscribed unless it is found to be utterly without
redeeming social value. This is so even though the book is found to
possess the requisite prurient appeal and to be patently offensive. Each
of the three federal constitutional criterion is to be applied indepen-
dently; the social value of the book can neither be weighed against nor
cancelled by its prurient appeal or patent offensiveness. Hence, even on
the view of the court below that Memoirs possessed only a modicum of
of social value, its judgment must be reversed .... 25
Justice Clark 2' and Justice White 7 stated that the making of "utter
lack of social value" a separate and third requirement for obscenity
was a basic rejection of Roth. They would hold that lack of social
value is a result of a materials meeting the requirements of requisite
purient appeal and patent offensiveness. To them, social value is not
a separate question, but a factor in and the effect of determining the
other two requirements. They also disagree that before material can
be found obscene it must have no social value. Even if material had
some slight social value, but it was so outweighed by its prurient
appeal and patent offensiveness, the material could be judged ob-
scene. The other four justices did not consider this issue in their
21 86 Sup. Ct. 975 (1966).
22 A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Mass.,
- Mass. -, 206 N.E.2d 403 (1965).
23 378 U.S. 184, 191 (1964) (opinion of Brennan, J.).
24 86 Sup. Ct. 975 (1966) (opinion of Brennan, J.).
25 Id. at 978.
26 A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Mass.,
86 Sup. Ct. 975, 989 (1966) (Clark, J., dissenting).
27 Id. at 999 (White, J., dissenting).
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opinions. As a result, only five justices considered this issue and they
are split three to two in favor of "utter lack of social value" as a
separate and third requirement for determining obscenity.
The practical result of this three-two split is that before any
material is determined to be obscene, it will have to meet three re-
quirements, not two. In effect, until one of the justices changes his
position, "utter lack of social value" is a third requirement for
obscenity. This results from the position of Justices Black and
Douglas,2" that even obscenity cannot be censored, and from Justice
Stewart's position that only hard-core pornography can be cen-
sored.29 Without the joinder of the three justices who maintain "utter
lack of social value" as a separate requirement, no majority of the
Court in favor of terming an item obscene could be reached.
This leaves another question in the law governing obscenity.
That is, what is social value? Perhaps this is a phrase which does not
submit itself to delineation and exactness and one should not expect
such. To date the only attempt to give any content to this phrase
was in lacobellis v. Ohio.3" There, the Court said, "Material dealing
with sex in a manner that advocates ideas . . .or that has literary
or scientific or artistic value or any other form of social importance,
may not be branded as obscenity. ..."I' While such general lan-
guage certainly does not present any exact legal boundaries, it prob-
ably does provide the closest thing possible to a legal definition of
the "utter lack of social value" requirement.
This general definition will permit much evidence and debate
as to the existence or non-existence of any saving value of the work
to society. Herein lies the value of this requirement. By permitting
proof that a work has worth to any area of life or segment of society
even though such work to the average person would only have pru-
rient appeal or be offensive, the rights and interests of the non-
average person are protected more than with only the prior two
requirements which were based on the average person concept. This
additional requirement is a recognition of the rights of the minority
as well as those of the majority. Certain works may have value to
the artist, the social or literary historian, or to other fields of special-
ized endeavor, which to the layman represent only sex or offensive-
ness. The addition and enforcement of this third requirement is a
means of preserving material with value to a minority from pro-
scription by the majority.
28 Supra n. 11.
29 Ginzburg v. United States, 86 Sup. Ct. 942, 956 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissent-
ing).
30 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
31 Id. at 191 (opinion of Brennan, J.). (Emphasis added.)
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With the decision in Ginzburg v. United States,2 the three re-
quirements for determining the status of material as obscene or
non-obscene take a new aspect and are further complicated and
confused. In the cases since Roth and prior to Ginzburg, the Court
had concerned itself only with the materials in question. The ques-
tion as to the class of the materials in issue was decided on the basis
of the material. Evidence as to any factors not concerned with the
material itself was not considered. The question was, does this item
in the abstract meet the requirement so as to be obscene? The Court
has "regarded the materials as sufficient in themselves for the de-
termination of the question of obscenity."3 There was some devia-
tion from this approach presented in Mishkin. There the Court
allowed evidence as to primary design, distribution and recipient
group as a factor in determining the existence of the requisite pru-
rient appeal. But the significant break from the past "in the abstract"
approach to a decision on the question of obscenity comes in Ginz-
burg.
The lower courts in holding certain publications obscene had
admitted evidence as to the conduct of the purveyor in and the cir-
cumstances of production, sale, and the publicizing of the material.
The Supreme Court said, "We agree that the question of obscenity
may include consideration of the setting in which the publications
were presented as an aid to determining the question of obscen-
ity . . . ,,)4 "Where the purveyor's sole emphasis is on the sexually
provocative aspects of his publications, that fact may be decisive in
the determination of obscenity.""5 Thus, no longer is material to be
judged only in the abstract, but the purveyor's attitude and actions
concerning the material may be considered in evaluating such mate-
rial. When the accused publications originate or are sold "as stock
in trade of the sordid business of pandering-'the business of pur-
veying textual or graphic matter openly advertised to appeal to the
erotic interest of their customers.' "3 -they may be deemed obscene
because of such context.
What role does this new element of the purveyor's conduct play
in regard to the other three requirements for determining the ques-
tion of obscenity? It would seem to be an evidentiary role. The set-
ting of the material is evidence to be considered in determining
whether the material has the requisite prurient appeal, patent of-
fensiveness and utterly lacks social value.87 This evidence would
32 86 Sup. Ct. 942 (1966).
33 Id. at 944.
3- Ginzburg v. United States, 86 Sup. Ct. 942, 944-945 (1966).
35 Id. at 947.
36 86 Sup. Ct. at 945.
37 Id. at 945, 947, 949.
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become important and perhaps decisive in cases where there was
"ambiguity or doubt"3" or in "close cases"3 9 concerning whether the
three requirements had been satisfied. In fact, evidence of pander-
ing by the purveyor may be enough to classify the material as ob-
scene even though such material by itself or in a different context
would not be obscene.40 The Court does not seem to mean that any
material could be classed as obscene just because of the purveyor's
treatment of it; but that in borderline cases, evidence of pandering
may be enough to push the material over the line into the obscene,
at least in that particular context.
By allowing this exterior evidence of a material's setting to
control its decision, and by recognizing that the material in question
might not be obscene in another context, the Court has created a
realm of material which is situationally obscene with resulting situa-
tional proscription and criminal conviction under a proper statute.
The Court said, "A conviction for mailing obscene publications, but
explained in part by the presence of this element [purveyor's con-
duct], does not necessarily suppress the materials in question, nor
chill their proper distribution for a proper use."' Material that is
obscene not because of itself but because of its setting (which will
support a criminal conviction of its purveyor) is not subject to total
proscription by state or federal action, but in a different setting can
be distributed free from censorship laws (and the purveyor is not
guilty of any crime).
Two serious objections exist as to this method of deciding
whether or not material is obscene. One is it confuses the actions of
the purveyor with the quality of the material. Two is that because
of one or two person's treatment of material, such material, which
would otherwise be constitutionally protected, may be severely sup-
pressed as to its distribution and availability to those with a legiti-
mate use for it.
If the Court desired to see pandering of material made a crime,
it should have in some way made this known and then waited for
proper statutes to be effected. The method used only confuses ob-
scenity laws more and leaves a potential group of material which can
shift its status as to being or not being obscene with a resulting shift
in law enforcement rights and individual rights concerning such
material. Is a person who is in possession of one of the publications
declared obscene in Ginzburg guilty of possessing obscene material
38 86 Sup. Ct. at 947.
39 Id. at 949.
40 86 Sup. Ct. at 950; A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of
Pleasure" v. Mass., 86 Sup. Ct. 975, 996 (1966).
41 86 Sup. Ct. at 949.
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under a state law prohibiting such? Can a state or the federal gov-
erment proscribe these publications without re-trying the issue of
their obscenity each time a new person sells them? The answers to
these and similar questions must await future cases in which the
effect of this decision creating this class of obscene material is de-
termined.
In the past the Court has gone to great lengths to strike down
obscenity laws which might have the effect of suppressing or pro-
scribing non-obscene material.42 Yet, here it has established a poten-
tial group of material that of itself is constitutionally protected but
which because of the purveyor's actions toward it becomes unpro-
tected to some unknown extent. For the Court to say that subjecting
the purveyo? to criminal conviction for distributing obscenity creates
no threat to the first amendment guaranties43 seems unrealistic. By
classifying material as obscene even under limited circumstances, a
threat of criminal charge and conviction is made to anyone else who
takes up the sale and distribution of that material. This threat could
result in the suppression of the material because no one will risk the
possible expense of trial and conviction. In practice this type of de-
cision may result in de facto censorship if not de jure censorship.
In such a case the guaranties of the first amendment are certainly
threatened.
CONCLUSION
At the present time three requirements exist for proving mate-
rial obscene: (1) it must have as its dominant theme, applying con-
temporary community standards, an appeal to the prurient interest
of the average person, which "average" person is generally based on
the community, but given material primarily designed for, and dis-
tributed to, a clearly defined sexually deviant class, that class may
form the base for the average person; (2) the material must be so
offensive on its face as to affront current community standards of
decency; (3) the material must be utterly without redeeming social
value. Each of these requirements is independent of the others, and
all three must coalesce before material can be judged obscene.
In determining whether these three requirements exist, evidence
of the purveyor's conduct regarding the material is admissible and
in close cases may control. Because of the creation of a class of
situationally obscene material, before one can determine whether
the material is totally censurable (inherently obscene), or only ob-
42 E.g. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); Smith v. California, 361 U.S.
147 (1959).
43 86 Sup. Ct. at 949.
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scene at times, and the resulting legal rights involved, one must look
to the basis of the Court's decision in classifying the material. Mate-
rial that was obscene may not be obscene in a different setting, and
material that was not obscene may become so in a proper setting.
"The central development that emerges from the aftermath of
Roth v. United States . . . is that no stable approach to the ob-
scenity problem has yet been devised by this Court.""
Monte McFadden
44 A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Mass.,
86 Sup. Ct. 975, 996 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
